



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20310

REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

10 NOV 1982

DAMI-CIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, DCI SECURITY COMMITTEE


SUBJECT: Policy on Unauthorized Disclosures and on Damage Assessments

Pursuant to your Memorandum, same subject, 28 October 1982, we reviewed the paper prepared by UDIS regarding national policy on damage assessments and offer the following comments:

We do not feel a new national policy is necessary. As a component of the Defense Department our opinion is their implementation of Executive Order 12356 and ISOO Directive Number 1 regarding damage assessment is adequate. We agree that a full damage assessment should be conducted in the situations depicted by UDIS (e.g., loss of classified military or specialized intelligence equipment, jeopardy of a technical collection system or human source, loss of a diplomatic pouch or penetration of a secure facility). The designation of permanent special teams to review assessments for quality control purposes is inappropriate for the military departments but may be appropriate for smaller agencies.

The items mentioned by UDIS to be checked by special teams (e.g., countermeasure recommendations, security/counterintelligence reviews, audits, inspections, etc.) in their review of damage assessments could be accomplished by making them mandatory issues in the governing regulations of each agency. National guidance mandating the sharing of damage assessments should be discouraged. We favor instead the selective sharing of such information using the newsletter method of the Air Force to synopsise those cases considered to have community applicability and interest. The establishment of a broad data base has merit as a diagnostic tool; however, the requirement to submit "all information" for inclusion in the base data which will be available to all agencies, albeit in a controlled manner, is questionable and should be discussed for clarification.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE


  
DONALD P. PRESS  
Colonel, GS  
Director of Counterintelligence

Mr. Bjorkman/77520  
Typed by R. Brashears

other Air Force activities. We suggest that a modest data base be initially attempted and concentrate on high priority targets --media "leaks," involving SCI for example. If successful, gradual inclusion of other matters into the "data base" could then be attempted.

f. Regulations: Concur.

2. The UDIS should be commended on its reports on unauthorized disclosures and damage assessments. Both offered a clear insight into the problems facing the Intelligence Community.

  
GEORGE J. MERCURIO, Colonel, USAF  
Air Force Member  
DCI Security Committee